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CASENOTES
Congress derived its power to legislate in this manner is not clear. The
Court said in the Toth case, "There can be no valid argument, therefore,
that civilian ex-servicemen must be court-martialed or not tried at all. If
that is so, it is only because Congress has not seen fit ...[to act]. '"12  This
same reasoning if applicable to ex-servicemen like Toth who actually did
commit crimes while under military jurisdiction, seems to be applicable
also to citizens whose only connection with the armed forces is by the mere
fortune of being dependents of military personnel. There is no doubt that
Congress can and should establish courts with jurisdiction over the military-
dependent class abroad. However, it would seem that courts-martial arc
not constitutionally proper for that purpose.*
HARVEY I. RFISE,1AN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SHERMAN ACT-
CROSS-ELASTICITY IN DETERMINING PERCENTAGE
OF MARKET CONTROL
The Attomey-General brought anti-trust proceedings against the de-
fendants, producers of 75% of all available cellophane sold in the United
States, relying on Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "Every ...
combination ... in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states."
The District Court denied the petition. Held, on appeal, affirmed (4-3).
The Supreme Court declared that merely producing such a percentage of
the market does not constitute a monopoly in restraint of trade. United
States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours 6 Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
The issue resolved in the instant case, that control of an overwhelming
amount of the market does not constitute monopolistic power, is an official
pronouncement of the adoption of a new interpretation of the Sherman Act.
Size of the company in comparison with the rest of the industry had been
the established rule when the size carried with it a possibility of abuse of
power.' This was the determinative test used by the courts when predatory
only alternatives to this course of action are either to allow citizens to stand trial by
foreign jurisdictions or not be tried at all. The inconsistency of this rationale is readily
seen by comparison with the Court's remark in the Toth case quoted at note 23 in this
text.
23. United States ex rel. Toth v. Qiiarles, 35 U.S. 11, 21 (1955).
*This note was begun in October of 1956. On November 5, 1956 the court agreed
to rehear both cases noted here. Counsel were invited to discuss or reargue the practical
necessities for or alternatives to court.martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents over-
seas, historical evidence bearing on the scope of such jurisdiction, relevance of distinc-
tions between dependents and civilians employed by the armed forces, and relevance ofdistinctions between major and petty offenses. See 25 U.S.I. Week 3136 (Nov. 6, 1956)(Nos. 701, 713).
1. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 796 (1946). Defendants
produced 63% of all smoking tobacco, 68% of all domestic cigarettes, 4497 of chewing
tobacco in 1939. ". . comparative size on this great scale inevitably increased the power
of these three to dominate all phases of the industry." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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practices had been evident in the past.? Monopolization was thus held
illegal per se when the practices of a company had been designed to result
in effective market control,3 or when the size itself was an earmark of
monopoly power without a specific intent to restrain trade or build mono-
poly.4 Judging monopolization by its effects on the market is a softening of
the test of size ' when that effect is negligible on a nationwide market.6
Consideration of the availability of other products has been used by the
courts when the other product is in most respects similar to that charged
as being in violation of the Act.7 This criterion is regarded when the use
of the product was for other purposes though virtually of the same con-
stituency." The newly-adopted approach broadens the scope of the above
tests and does not require products to be of the same constituency so long
as other products of the same general usage are available by examining the
"relevant market" in the determination of the extent of control of tile
industry.0
In reaching a decision three possible approaches were available to the
Court: 10 (1) An enterprise has monopolized if it has maintained a power
to exclude others by acquiring an overwhelming share of the market. This
was the test laid down by Judge L. Hand in the Aluminum Case.1  (2) It
is a violation of Section 2 for one having effective control of the market to
use, or plan to use, any exclusionary practice, even though it is not a technical
restraint of trade. Thus production of 75% of the cellophane could have
been, in and of itself, the earmark of monopoly.' 2 This rule disregards other
factors and deals only with the size of the enterprise in issue. (3) The third
approach disregards size as the paramount criterion and stresses effect on
2. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932). ". . . but size carries
with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is
proved to have been utilized in the past."
3. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105, 106 (1948). United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 1The doctrine of this longstanding
case was overruled in United States v. Aluminum Co. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). Compared on a
nationwide basis, the company supplied A of I % of the entire market even though
it was the largest producer on the west coast and mainly served an 11 state area,
7. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
8. See note 3 supra.
9. United States v, E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
10. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Mass.
1953).
11. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). A company
monopolizes whenever it does business when it has reached such a disproportionate size
in comparison with the rest of the industry.
12. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105, 106 (1948). "It is, however, not
always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order
to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade
or monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrange-
ments . . . to require a greater showing would cripple the Act .. "
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the nrket and the use to which the commodity will be put.13 The majority
distinguished the first two tests and applied the third rule on a much
broadened basis."4 The "relevant market" concept has been used in this
decision to include within its framework products which are not of the
same constituency, price, or use in packaging, 15 but have all been compared
with cellophane to determine the percentage of the market controlled."
The decision states that since other products are available in the "relevant
market", i.e., the entire packaging industry, production of 75% of all avail-
able cellophane is not a monopoly in restraint of trade. Similar reasoning
was rejected by Judge L. Hand when he refused a comparison of secondary
and virgin aluminum, since the two products had some different usages even
though their constituencies were the same.'1 The concurring opinion by
Justice Frankfurter supports the conclusion that cellophane is part of a
"relevant market" for flexible packaging materials. The majority takes
cognizance of new economic theories' 8 when they speak of determining
"cross-elasticity" in the availability of other products in the market.19 "The
availability of other products must be considered without confining industrial
activities to trim categories." 20
The products to which cellophane is compared vary to such an extent
in their make-up and use that no workable boundaries are established as
regards the market to be examined. Based on this reasoning, future de-
fendants in anti-trust prosecutions will be able to show that even though
they possess overwhelming percentage control in one specific industry, com-
13. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). Accord, United
States v. Paramount Pictures 334 U.S. 131 (1945). This case stresses the importance of
characterizing the nature of the market to be sewed and the leverage on the market of
the particular business in issue.
14. United States v. E. 1. DuPont de Neusours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956),
Difficulties of interpretation have arisen in the application of the Sherman Act
in view of the technical changes in production of commodities and the new dis-
tribution practices. They have called forth reappiaisal of the effect of the Act by
business and government.
United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
15. Id. United States v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra note 14 at 405.
16. See note 13 supra at page 527, 528. The Court said:
In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do not think the
dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look rather to the percent-
age of business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition, whether
the action springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the
probable development of the industry, consumer demands, and other character-
istics of the market. We do not undertake to prescribe any set of percentage
figures by which to measure the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement
of its activities by the purchase of the assets of a competitor. The relative effect
of percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor
is placed. (Emphasis supplied)
17. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
Taking the industry as a whole, we can say nothing more definite than that,
although secondary does not compete at all in some uses, (whether because of
"sales resistance" only, or because of actual metallurgical inferiority) for most
purposes it competes upon a substantial equality with virgin.
18. LILIENTHAL, BiG BusiNrss: A NEw ERA, c.5. (1953).
19. United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956).
20. Id. at 395.
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parison on any broad general market will relieve them of any liability under
the Act. The dissenting opinion appears more logical in applying reasoning
which excludes a comparison of cellophane with the whole flexible pack-
aging market. 21 A manufacturer who utilizes cellophane for his product
uses it because of the particular qualities which it, and no other material,
possesses. The adoption of this expanded rule amounts to a judicial nulli-
fication of the Sherman Act in this type of proceeding. The Sherman Act
was originally adopted to prevent anyone from using his size to unfair
advantage, and this decision does not seem consistent with that spirit.
EDGAR LEwIs
FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-
STATE REVENUE ACTS
Petitioner, a labor organizer, instituted an action in a federal district
court to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance imposing an
alleged exorbitant tax' on petitioner's activities. Held, the fcdcral prohi-
bition against interference with the tax-collecting procedure of a state2 is
removed when it is shown that there is no speedy and efficient remedy in
the courts of that state, and there exists a threat of genuine and irretrieveablc
loss. Denton v. City of Carrollton, 234 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1956).
The federal courts' recognition of the sovereign status of the severl
states has at all times been the motivation behind their reluctancy to inter-
fere with the fiscal procedures of a state 3
21. Id. at 423.
The majority opinion purports to reject the theory of "interindustry competi-
tion." Brick, steel, wood, cement and stone, it says, are "too different" to be
placed in the same market. But cellophane, glassine, wax papers, sulphite papers,
greaseproof and vegetable parchment papers, aluminum foil, cellulose acetate,
pliofilm and other films are not "too different", the opinion concludes. The
majority approach would apparently enable a monopolist of motion picture
exhibition to avoid Sherman Act consequences by showing that motion pictures
compete in substantial measure with legitimate theater, television, radio, sporting
events and other forms of entertainment. Here, too, "shifts of business" un-
doubtedly accompany fluctuations in price and "there are market alternatives
that buyers may readily use for their purposes.
1. Municipal Ordinance, City of Carrollton, Georgia:
An ordinance providing for a business license tax and per diem license for any
person conducting the business or occupation of labor union, union agent or
lbor union promoter or labor union organizer ...j . [T]he applicant shall pay a license tax in the amount of $1,000.00 and shall
thereafter deposit at the beginning of each twenty four hour period of each day
for each person engaged in any said activity the sum of $100.00 with the City
Clerk for the continuance of said license during said twenty four hour period.
There will be no proration of the initial license of $1,000.00.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952). "The district court shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
3. Matthews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
